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Abstract
Some philosophers argue that if market reasoning exceeds certain limits, it may ‘cor-
rupt’ certain cherished values; and the tendency of modern economics to encourage 
such ‘corruption’ has its roots in its normative foundations. Michael Sandel goes 
further and suggests that this tendency can be traced to utilitarian reasoning. I argue 
that the desire to restrict the scope of economics can be found in the utilitarian ori-
gins of neoclassical economics. The argument that market reasoning may ‘corrupt’ 
various values has gained credence from the work of market enthusiasts like Gary 
Becker but does not apply to the traditional framework of welfare economics. Fur-
thermore, if economists adopt the informed desire or preference view of welfare 
endorsed by some utilitarians, certain arguments advanced by these philosophers 
can be rebutted.
Keywords Market · Welfare economics · Utilitarianism · Preferences · Information
JEL Classification A12 · A13 · B13 · D61 · D63 · I30 · I31 · I38
‘It is the lowest rank of feelings which we treat here. The calculus of utility 
aims at supplying the ordinary wants of man at the least cost of labour’ Jevons 
(1871, 93).
1 Introduction
The scope of economics has been much expanded over time, notably due to the 
pioneering works of Gary Becker. Becker argued that the economic approach can 
be applied to all areas of human behaviour. In recent years, some moral and politi-
cal philosophers, notably Anderson (1993) and more recently Sandel (2012, 2013), 
have raised questions about the limits of the market. They have argued that modern 
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economics encourages the spread of ‘market reasoning’ to areas where it was not 
previously applied and where, arguably, it has no place. In his version of this argu-
ment, Sandel traces the tendency of economics to encourage market reasoning to the 
way economists think about value and to the fact that, even if some economists are 
aware of the limitations of utilitarian reasoning, many of the normative conclusions 
economists reach rest on utilitarian assumptions (Sandel 2013, 123). In her version 
of the argument, Anderson explicitly argues that the spread of market reasoning out-
side certain domains is corrosive of other values. Sandel calls this the ‘corruption’ 
argument. This argument suggests that modes of reasoning that are appropriate to 
‘lower-order goods’ when deployed to reason about ‘higher-order goods’ degrade 
those goods. Arrow (1997) noted that arguments of this sort have a pedigree. He 
wrote that: ‘[o]ne of the oldest critiques of economic thinking has been its perceived 
disregard of the deeper and more sacred aspects of life’ (Arrow 1997, 757). Fur-
thermore, some economists (e.g. Besley 2012; Bruni and Sugden 2013, 142) have 
responded thoughtfully to recent versions of these arguments and have argued that 
economists should engage with them. Indeed, Bruni and Sugden (2013, 141) asso-
ciate arguments of this sort with virtue ethics in moral philosophy and ‘a radical 
critique of the market economy’ according to which ‘economics is complicit in an 
assault on virtue and on human flourishing’.1 Finally, Sandel (2013, 139) has also 
suggested that to address the moral limits of the market economics needs to ‘recon-
nect with its origins in moral and political philosophy’.
In this paper, I provide a distinct response to some of the arguments in this litera-
ture which connects them to the origins of neoclassical economics in utilitarianism. 
While the claims made by these philosophers are sometimes seen as very critical 
of economics, they are very close relatives of views expressed by William Stanley 
Jevons. Jevons’ The Theory of Political Economy was heavily influenced by the clas-
sical utilitarians, notably by Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill. Jevons took from the 
utilitarians the view that human beings are motivated by the pursuit of utility or 
pleasure, and based his analysis on this insight. One important difference between 
Bentham’s and Mill’s utilitarianism is that Mill (1962, 259) distinguished between 
different qualities of pleasure: he thought that there were certain pleasures which 
involved the use of the ‘higher faculties’ and that even a small amount of these was 
preferable to a very large amount of some ‘lower-order pleasure’. Jevons took up 
Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures and argued that political econ-
omy should only be concerned with the lowest order of pleasures. Clearly, to the 
degree that a stringent restriction on the scope of the discipline is here found at its 
utilitarian roots, it seems unlikely that the goal of expanding the scope of economics 
and market analysis can be traced, without controversy, to those roots.
1 This paper is restricted in scope in as much as it only considers some of the arguments which critics 
like Anderson and Sandel advance. It is also restricted in scope in as much as it only considers one theme 
of this special issue—i.e. virtue and the ‘virtue ethics critique’ of economics. I do not discuss issues 
relating to motivation, incentives and awards and which are relevant to the theme of ‘prizes’ which are 
discussed by some of these critics of economics (see, for example, Sandel 2012, 107–130).
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In one statement of his views, Sandel (2013, 122) argues that the apparent inabil-
ity of modern economics to define the limits of market reasoning originates in part 
from its attempts to remain ‘value-free’. In this paper, I argue—to the contrary—that 
the standard or traditional framework of welfare economics involves plural values—
notably efficiency and equity inter alia—though in modern times—certainly since 
the contributions of Hicks (1939)—it has eschewed any explicit commitment to a 
moral theory such as utilitarianism. The fact that modern welfare economics does 
not endorse any particular moral theory has not, of course, stopped particular econo-
mists from endorsing some or other moral theory. In the second half of the twentieth 
century (Harsanyi 1953, 1955, 1982, 1995, 1997 inter alia) famously endorsed a 
version of utilitarianism. He also endorsed the informed preference view of welfare 
which is sometimes linked to Mill’s utilitarianism. In this paper, I argue that even if 
some economists who are ‘market enthusiasts’ have proposed the more widespread 
use of market analysis and of the market as an allocation mechanism in various con-
texts, the standard framework of welfare economics itself does not necessarily do 
so, nor does it encourage it. The well-known case in favour of the market—which 
is usually advanced in terms of the first fundamental welfare theorem—is an argu-
ment for the efficiency of the market and is always qualified by the observations that 
there are conditions under which markets will not produce efficient results and that 
market equilibrium might involve an inequitable distribution of goods. I argue that if 
this theorem is understood in terms of the informed (or rational) desire or preference 
view of welfare, economists can respond to some criticisms that Anderson and San-
del advance. However, this defence of welfare economics is qualified by the fact that 
people’s ordinary preferences are not necessarily informed or rational. If preferences 
are ill-informed or irrational, then markets might fail to deliver efficiency and there 
is a case for government intervention. I also consider the ‘corruption’ argument and 
the reasons why Anderson thinks welfare economics inappropriately encourages 
the spread of market reasoning. I argue that Anderson’s case is weaker if welfare is 
understood in terms of informed preference, and that economists have thought about, 
and can respond to another of the issues (‘commodity fetishism’) that Anderson is 
concerned about. Anderson’s argument is, I suggest, best understood as an argument 
against market enthusiasm rather than against traditional welfare economics.
Before presenting the argument of the paper in detail, I should also explain how it 
differs from one previous response to Sandel’s version of the argument from within 
the economics profession. In his excellent paper, Tim Besley provides a survey of a 
very wide range of work in economics which is relevant to Sandel’s discussion. He 
notes that in Sandel’s version of the argument ‘the economics profession comes in 
for a fair bit of stick’ and that ‘[e]conomists are accused of having views about mar-
kets which lead to repugnant conclusions’ (Besley 2012, 479). He also worries about 
the dangers of ‘taking examples and quoting selectively, and then characterising this 
as the views of economists in general’. I share this concern. However, Besley adds 
that he did ‘recognize all the positions that’ Sandel ‘attributes to members of the 
economics profession, i.e. they are reflective of what some (perhaps even many) 
economists believe’ (Besley 2012, 479). Here I part ways with Besley: one of my 
claims is that because Sandel mischaracterises one of the basic tenets of welfare 
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economics and interprets it in terms of its utilitarian heritage part of his characteri-
sation of ‘economics’ is misleading and unhelpful.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sect. 1, I introduce the informed desire or 
preference view of welfare and make some preliminary comments about ‘econom-
ics’ and the relationship between preferences and commodities; in Sect. 2, I argue 
that Sandel mischaracterises a central result in welfare economics and explain 
various alternative defences of the market; I discuss the ‘corruption’ argument and 
attempts to distinguish ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ goods which aim to restrict the scope of 
the market or of economics as a discipline in Sect. 3; and Sect. 4 concludes.
2  Informed preference, welfare and the ‘economic approach’
Economists sometimes equate people’s preferences with their tastes and welfare 
with the satisfaction of preferences. The informed desire or preference view suggests 
that the fulfilment of actual desires or preferences does not constitute well-being: 
well-being is constituted by the fulfilment of informed desires or preferences. This 
view of welfare was first explicitly advanced by Henry Sidgwick (1981), though it 
is implicit in John Stuart Mill’s well-known discussion of ‘higher-order’ and ‘lower-
order’ pleasures. Mill famously wrote that: ‘[o]f two pleasures, if there be one to 
which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irre-
spective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable 
pleasure’ (Mill 1962, 259).
In modern utilitarian thought in the second half of the twentieth century, a ver-
sion of the informed preference or desire view was endorsed in economics by Har-
sanyi (1953, 1955, 1982, 1995, 1997) and in moral philosophy by Griffin (1986) 
inter alia.2 Different versions of this account articulate slightly distinct versions 
of the requirement for desires or preferences to be informed. In one version, Har-
sanyi refers to a person’s ‘true preferences’, the ‘preferences he would have if he 
had all the relevant factual information, always reasoned with the greatest possi-
ble care, and were in a state of mind most conducive to rational choice’ (Harsanyi 
1982, 55). Here, as in other formulations, the relevant preferences are in important 
respects both informed and rational. Harsanyi distinguishes ‘true preferences’ from 
a person’s ‘manifest preferences’ which are ‘his actual preferences as manifested by 
his observed behaviour, including preferences possibly based on erroneous factual 
beliefs, or on careless logical analysis, or on strong emotions that at the moment 
greatly hinder rational choice’ (Harsanyi 1982, 55). On a later version of Harsanyi’s 
view, a person’s informed preferences are those ‘hypothetical preferences he would 
have if he had all the relevant information and had made full use of this information’ 
(Harsanyi 1997, 133).
2 Hausman and McPherson (2009) and Hausman (2012), chapters 7 and 8 actually argue that the eco-
nomics profession appears to endorse a version of the informed preference view, but that this view is 
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By way of contrast, Griffin’s view focusses on desires rather than preferences. On 
one version of his information requirement, a desire is informed when it is ‘formed 
by appreciation of the nature of its object, and it includes anything necessary to 
achieve it’ (Griffin 1986, 14). In another version, informed desires are those which 
avoid all the problems he finds with actual desires, and these include faults which 
derive from lack of information as well as from logical error inter alia (see Griffin 
1986, 12–14). Once more the information requirement includes a rationality con-
dition and informed desires are also in important respects rational. Indeed, I will 
sometimes say, rather loosely, that the desires or preferences involved in these views 
are both informed and rational, though the relevant form of rationality involved is 
usually part of the information requirement. One element that is common to Griffin’s 
view and Harsanyi’s later statements of his view is that they both endorse a list of 
those things that make a human life go better. In Griffin’s case, the relevant things—
‘prudential values’—are the objects of informed desire. These include: autonomy 
and liberty; accomplishment; enjoyment; deep personal relations of the sort we find 
in friendship and love; and understanding (Griffin 1986, 67–68). Harsanyi advances 
a similar list. He thinks of prudential values as the objects of ‘basic desires’. He lists 
the following: ‘[m]aterial comfort; physical security; freedom to control our own 
lives; good health; a job suitable for our personal abilities and interests; deep per-
sonal relations in mutual love, in marriage and in true friendship; to have children 
and to be a good parent; to achieve better understanding of the world and of our 
place in the world; enjoyment of beauty in nature and in art; to have worthwhile 
accomplishments of some kind; and to make our own behaviour consistent with our 
moral values’ (Harsanyi 1995, 323).
Are these accounts of welfare and the lists of values they advance compatible 
with standard economics? This might appear to be an odd question to ask, since 
Harsanyi was an economist (and won the Nobel prize in economics). I address it, 
nonetheless, since it might be argued that Harsanyi’s position is in some way excep-
tional. Furthermore, the papers in which Harsanyi advances his list of prudential 
values emerged very late in his career and differ in significant ways from his earlier 
statements of his view (e.g. Harsanyi 1953, 1955). In what follows, I focus on one 
characterisation of ‘economics’ which Sandel discusses: Gary Becker’s ‘economic 
approach to human behavior’ (Becker 1976). I do not do so with a view to arguing 
that Becker’s approach is an informed desire or preference view, but because, like 
some versions of that view, it endorses the idea that there are some fundamental or 
basic objects of desire or preference however diverse our actual preferences might 
appear.
In characterising the discipline, Becker distinguishes economics from other dis-
ciplines in terms of its commitments to: maximising behaviour; the use of the mar-
ket as an allocation system; and stable preferences. Of these, the crucial assump-
tion for the present discussion is the assumption of stable preferences. According to 
Becker, this assumption is defensible because certain objects of preference remain 
stable however much our actual preferences change over time. The relevant prefer-
ences are not preferences over ‘market goods such as oranges, automobiles, or medi-
cal care’ but relate to the ‘underlying objects of choice’ which are associated with 
‘fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence, 
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or envy, that do not bear a stable relation to marketable goods and services’ (Becker 
1976, 5). Clearly, this list of the fundamental aspects of life is not far removed from 
the lists of prudential values that Harsanyi and Griffin endorse. There are obvious 
differences in as much as Becker’s list covers objects such as envy which is clearly 
not a prudential value. My claim is only that there is no reason why economists can-
not use such lists. In advancing his list of prudential values, Harsanyi argues that all 
of them make our lives go better and this is because ‘all human beings have much 
the same basic biological and psychological needs and so have much the same basic 
desires’ (Harsanyi 1997, 139). As regards the stability of some objects of desire and 
preference, there seems to be little to separate Becker and Harsanyi here and this 
aspect of Becker’s ‘economic approach’ is clearly compatible with Harsanyi’s later 
versions of his account.
In his characterisation of the economic approach, Becker makes the market 
central. He is—what I shall call–a ‘market enthusiast’ within the discipline. By a 
‘market enthusiast’, I have in mind someone who has argued for the use of market 
analysis beyond its traditional domain either in economic analysis or in policy dis-
cussions. Sandel’s focus on Becker’s work in characterising the ‘economic approach 
to life’ (Sandel 2012, 47–51) means that he takes ‘market enthusiasm’ to be repre-
sentative of economics as a whole. Becker mixes his market enthusiasm with the 
view that the discipline of economics is relevant to all human behaviour and falls at 
the opposite end of the discipline to Jevons in terms of his view of its ambitions and 
scope. Of course, not all modern economists are market enthusiasts, nor would they 
necessarily take seriously the idea of an economic analysis of all areas of human 
behaviour including areas such as marriage. For example, in one response to Beck-
er’s characterisation of the ‘economic approach’ and his theory of marriage, Amar-
tya Sen (1984, 372) suggested that ‘the approach does remain rather crude’. In the 
specific case of its application to marriage, he added: ‘[c]onceptualising marriage 
as a “two person firm with either member being the ‘entrepreneur’ who ‘hires’ the 
other” and “’receives residual profits’ can perhaps be said to be a rather simple view 
of a very complex relationship’. So it is important to note that Becker’s characterisa-
tion of the economic approach provoked considerable controversy within economics 
and that there are economists who did not, and do not, share his market enthusiasm.
Having noted the fact that Becker may not be a ‘representative’ economist, I 
should mention another relevant discussion in economics which has been influential 
in characterising ‘commodities’ or ‘goods’. In a well-known discussion, Lancaster 
(1966, 133; see also Gorman 1956) distinguished between goods and their charac-
teristics. He suggested that ‘a meal (treated as a single good) possesses nutritional 
characteristics but it also possesses aesthetic characteristics, and different meals will 
possess these characteristics in different relevant proportions’. These characteristics 
are, on his account, the objects of preference. He writes that: ‘[u]tility or prefer-
ence orderings are assumed to rank collections of characteristics and only to rank 
collections of goods indirectly through the characteristics they possess’. Lancas-
ter’s influential analysis, like Becker’s approach, does not treat commodities as the 
ultimate objects of preference. While standard texts in economics do not say much 
about the nature of commodities or goods, a variation of this analysis of how to dis-
tinguish goods—restricted to their physical characteristics—appeared in a canonical 
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treatment of competitive markets when Arrow and Hahn (1971, 17) wrote that: ‘[a] 
good may be defined by its physical characteristics, its location in space, and the 
date of delivery’. Certainly, the characteristics of goods—as Lancaster understood 
them—link more directly to the ‘fundamental aspects of life’—such as health and 
pleasure—and indeed to the objects of informed desire or preference than commodi-
ties themselves. Of course, there may be characteristics of a good which are neither 
fundamental aspects of life nor prudential values: a car might be desired because it 
is ‘flashy’. Nonetheless, the characteristics of commodities provide a bridge between 
commodities and the ultimate objects of informed preference or desire. Even the 
desirability of a ‘flashy’ car might ultimately derive from a desire for status or 
respect in society, and such status or respect might be the sort of thing that might 
be a fundamental aspect of life or prudential value. Before moving on, I should add 
that while I have argued that informed desire or preference views are not incompat-
ible with economic analysis, that is quite different from claiming that all economists 
will or should necessarily endorse them. Some economists might well find some 
developments of the informed desire view unattractive (see, for example, Sugden 
2000), just as some might object to Mill’s distinction between higher- and lower-
order pleasures (see, for example, Layard 2005, 22–23). So while I will argue in this 
paper that the informed desire or preference view might help economists address 
some criticisms, I do not claim that all economists would or should necessarily wish 
to endorse this view to address them.
3  Alternative defences of the market: efficiency, welfare 
and opportunity
In discussing the case for the market—and specifically the case for market alloca-
tions over queues—Sandel (2012, 29) mentions two lines of argument: one of which 
he terms ‘libertarian’, while the other is ‘utilitarian’. I focus here on the second of 
these. Sandel’s thought is that market exchanges allow for both parties to a transac-
tion to benefit. This thought is in itself unproblematic as it is an expression of the 
familiar idea that markets facilitate mutually advantageous transactions. But then 
Sandel adds that as a result the market improves the welfare of both parties—thus 
increasing total ‘collective well-being and social utility’ (Sandel 2012, 29). This 
additional claim suggests that in making the case for the market, economists are 
utilitarian or at least relying on some sort of moral theory. Sandel thinks that this 
line of argument also suggests that if the use of the market mechanism spreads to 
areas where it is not currently in operation, then social welfare will increase. This 
looks like an argument for the commodification of some areas of life on utilitarian 
grounds.
But this is not the standard view in welfare economics. The case for the market in 
welfare economics is Paretian rather than utilitarian: it says that, under certain con-
ditions, market allocations are Pareto efficient—in the sense that one cannot improve 
one person’s welfare without worsening someone else’s. In standard statements, 
the first fundamental welfare theorem states that, under well-known conditions, in 
a market equilibrium there is no alternative distribution which leaves at least one 
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person better off without making someone else worse off. And, in fact, even in San-
del’s book (Sandel 2012, 29–30) the economics text book he cites makes the case 
for the market in terms of efficiency rather than on utilitarian grounds. Sandel’s ref-
erence to utilitarianism here is mistaken and misleading. Furthermore, the standard 
case for the market in welfare economics is usually qualified by the observation that 
Pareto efficient allocations can be inequitable. The case for the market in welfare 
economics thus recognises multiple values without making any claims about their 
relative weight. That is one reason why welfare economics does not and cannot on 
its own adjudicate on proposals about the scope of the market. Its failure to do so 
appears to be a disappointment for Sandel, but it relates to one of the arguments—
about the potentially unfair nature of market allocations—that Sandel (2012, 110) 
himself makes central in his book. On the question of what goods are and are not 
commodities, standard results in welfare economics do not take a view. In stand-
ard expositions of the first fundamental welfare theorem, for example, the vector of 
commodities is simply taken as given. For example, Arrow (1951, 511) merely sup-
poses that there are n commodities in his exposition (see also Qizilbash 2005).
In a more recent statement, Sandel (2013, 122) argues that the failure of econo-
mists to take a view on which ‘goods are up for sale’ stems from their desire to 
pursue a value-free science. But if I am right, part of the reason that economics 
as a discipline cannot make claims of this sort is that while it recognises plural 
values (efficiency and equity inter alia), the discipline does not itself take any all-
encompassing view of how to rank values of the sort which a moral theory such 
as utilitarianism might provide. Ironically, one way in which economics could do 
some of the work that Sandel requires of it would be to endorse some form of moral 
theory like utilitarianism. Indeed, on the version of utilitarianism which Harsanyi 
endorses—which recommends a moral code or set of rules which maximises aver-
age welfare—one might define the limits of markets on the basis of this moral prin-
ciple. But, not all economists are utilitarians and economists take different views of 
morality, and the discipline allows them to do so. In this respect also economics is 
pluralist: it allows economists to take quite different views about morality. On this 
basis, one would also expect some economists to be more enthusiastic about markets 
than others and that is indeed the case. Many of the economists Sandel cites are 
market enthusiasts. The spread of the market into realms where it has traditionally 
not had any significant role suggests that market enthusiasts are succeeding. But if 
that is the right reading of the situation, the issue that Sandel is raising is not about 
the discipline as a whole or about welfare economics. Rather it is about the success 
of market enthusiasts. If they are concerned about the degree of that success, Sandel 
and others like him might be better served by discussing at greater length and sup-
porting the arguments of those within economics who are less enthusiastic about the 
market.3
Let us suppose then that Sandel has simply mischaracterised the case for the 
market in economics, as I think he has. Is there anything else we can learn from 
3 Sandel does, nonetheless, sometimes invoke economists in support of his own arguments (see, for 
example, Sandel 2012, 38).
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his discussion? In thinking about this point, consider the standard interpretation of 
Pareto efficiency in economics:
(1) A distribution is Pareto efficient if no alternative distribution makes at least one 
person better off, while nobody else is worse off.
This is the interpretation of the Pareto criterion I have thus far used in charac-
terising the first fundamental welfare theorem. It characterises Pareto efficiency in 
terms of welfare. Alternatively, Pareto efficiency can be characterised in terms of 
preference as follows:
(2) A distribution is Pareto efficient if no alternative distribution allows at least one 
person to reach a more preferred point, while nobody else is at a point which is 
less preferred.
Now often economists take (1) and (2) to be equivalent. The equivalence is some-
times implicitly assumed. This assumption in turn implies acceptance of the view 
that welfare is constituted by the satisfaction of (actual) preferences. Sen explains 
the tendency to equate preferences and welfare as follows:
In the standard general equilibrium literature, individual preference orderings 
… play two distinct parts, to wit: (i) they determine individual choices … and 
(ii) they represent individual welfares used as the basis of welfarist evaluations 
of market equilibria… The two together amount to assuming that each per-
son’s choices are guided solely by the maximization of her own welfare, that 
is, by the self-interested pursuit of personal welfare. Sen (2002, 520).
Since one may wish to drop the assumption of self-interested behaviour, it is 
important, as Sen notes, that the ‘basic analytical results relate directly to the fulfil-
ment of preference satisfaction’. Someone who holds an informed desire or prefer-
ence view would only accept the equivalence between (1) and (2) if the preferences 
in (2) are informed in the relevant sense. There are clearly cases where (1) and (2) 
can come apart so that the self-interest assumption is violated. One example would 
be where someone has a preference for smoking or for taking some drug but does 
not know of its harmful effects. Or it might be that someone knows that smoking 
or drug taking is harmful but is addicted to it and fails to choose according to their 
rational or informed preference.
If, by contrast, economists focus on people’s actual desires or preferences in 
defining Pareto efficiency and treat (2) as the normative criterion for the evaluation 
of the market, they might indeed fall foul of the criticism that they ‘assume that all 
values are merely subjective preferences not open to reasoned argument’ (Sandel 
2013, 121). By contrast, reasoning would be required on the informed desire or pref-
erence view and it would only be in the presence of informed rationality that econo-
mists would be able to make a claim about the market as a mechanism which pro-
motes welfare. However, if one holds onto (1) and adopts the informed or rational 
preference view, one would also conclude that—in Harsanyi’s terms—to the degree 
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that people’s ‘manifest’ preferences diverge from their ‘informed’ or ‘true’ prefer-
ences, market allocations may not be efficient in terms of welfare. If so, there is mar-
ket failure and a case for government intervention to ensure that people make better 
informed and reasoned decisions. On this reading, even if the use of the informed 
desire view can help to defend the framework of welfare economics, it also empha-
sises the strong nature of the assumptions under which markets produce Pareto effi-
cient outcomes. To this degree, this defence of welfare economics may weaken the 
case for the market.
Explicit recognition of the self-interest assumption, and violations of it, might 
lead economists and governments to intervene by, for example, providing consumers 
with information on the harmful effects of smoking, or of taking certain drugs. And 
further claims about violations of the self-interest assumption have emerged from 
the recent behavioural economics literature and have led to a variety of ‘paternal-
istic’ proposals advanced by Camerer et al. (2003) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
inter alia (see also Conly 2013) which are motivated by behavioural economics. 
There is a question about how much intervention might be justified in this way on 
Harsanyi’s view or by informed desire or preference views in general. Harsanyi was, 
to some degree, aware of the issue at the time he wrote his later papers. He distin-
guished ‘positive paternalism’ which ‘would try coercively to prevent self-damaging 
behaviour’. He believed that—in a democratic society—such paternalism can be jus-
tified ‘only in cases where such behavior would inflict utterly intolerable damage 
on the agent or would seriously damage innocent bystanders’ (Harsanyi 1997, 134). 
By contrast, Harsanyi endorsed ‘negative paternalism’ which would ‘refuse to help 
and to subsidize activities we consider to be against the agent’s own interests’ (Har-
sanyi 1997, 134). Harsanyi’s remarks suggest that he would not endorse most coer-
cive ‘paternalistic’ interventions but might potentially support ‘libertarian pater-
nalist’ proposals, which interfere with choice without blocking freedom to choose. 
How many such interventions might be endorsed on his view? Qizilbash (2012) 
has argued that there may be significant limitations to the libertarian paternalistic 
agenda on an informed desire or preference view, notably if (as in Griffin’s case) 
that view endorses some strong version of the value of autonomy which requires 
that people should be able to make their own mistakes. As a consequence, there may 
be a tension between the case for government intervention where preferences are 
irrational or ill-informed and a resistance to most forms of ‘positive’ or ‘libertarian’ 
paternalism. How might Harsanyi have responded to this tension? To the degree that 
there is a conflict, Harsanyi’s position would most likely go beyond the standard 
framework of welfare economics in potentially trading off these two considerations 
on the basis of his version of rule-utilitarianism.4
4 The rule-utilitarian would no doubt take into account not merely the possibility that consumers are 
sometimes irrational or ill-informed but also that government officials and regulators may also be simi-
larly irrational and ill-informed, even if we assume that they are benign (which they may not be). These 
considerations also imply a restriction of the libertarian paternalist agenda. On this point, see the ‘rule-
consequentialist’ argument discussed in Sunstein (2014, 116–122).
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Some economists might still defend market efficiency in terms of (2) even if it 
does not coincide with (1). Their reason might have to do with the idea that the abil-
ity to achieve a more preferred point reflects an increase in opportunity or freedom 
even if it does not coincide with an increase in welfare.5 One version of the case for 
the market which is based on reasoning of this sort was advanced by Sen (1993). 
On this version, the case for the efficiency of the market is made in terms of free-
dom understood as opportunity-freedom rather than welfare. I should note that the 
notion of opportunity-freedom here is primarily understood in terms of the opportu-
nity to satisfy preferences (over commodities), rather than in terms of Sen’s idea of 
‘capability’ (e.g. Sen 1985) understood in terms of the range of lives—constituted 
by ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ which he terms ‘functionings’—which one has reason to 
value and from which one can choose one. Sen has separately argued that capability, 
thus understood, might be relevant to the evaluation of the quality of life, egalitarian 
justice and development. In discussing the case for the market in terms of opportu-
nity, Sen’s basic claim is that if the market is, roughly speaking, efficient in terms of 
preference satisfaction, it is also plausibly efficient in terms of opportunity-freedom 
(to satisfy preferences).6 Can this claim be extended to suggest that the market gen-
erates capability efficiency? Sen believes that it can, because he thinks that the chief 
contribution of the capability approach is in areas where there are interpersonal 
comparisons of the quality of life. But in judgements of whether or not a distribution 
is Pareto efficient, such comparisons are not involved. As a consequence, there may 
be ‘congruence between the budget sets in commodity space and the ranking of the 
corresponding capability sets in the functioning space’ (Sen 2002, 523). Thus, he 
concludes that ‘[i]f this relationship is formally axiomatized, then … efficiency of 
opportunity-freedoms in commodity space can be correspondingly extended to … 
efficiency of opportunity-freedoms in the space of functionings’ (Sen 2002, 523). 
Sen (2002, 524) does nonetheless add that if one accepts a capability perspective 
and evaluates distributional issues in terms of people’s capability, the market may 
produce more inequality than would be observed in the standard framework where 
one focusses on preferences over commodities because of unequal advantages in 
converting commodities (or income) into capability (see Sen 2002, 524).
Sen’s notion of efficiency in terms of opportunity-freedom allows one to defend 
the efficiency of the market even when the self-interest assumption is relaxed. It 
does not, however, entirely get rid of the problem of potentially problematic prefer-
ences. Indeed, one might still be worried about the kinds of freedom or opportunity 
that are promoted by the market. That thought is nonetheless not new to economists, 
since Sen (1970, 1979, 2017) also made the point many years ago in his work on 
social choice (and on the ‘Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal’ in particular) that 
economists may need to examine the content and nature of the preferences that are 
used in evaluating states of affairs. If the opportunity-based case for the efficiency of 
the market relies on actual preferences, some economists might contend that there is 
reason to stress the limitations of the Pareto criterion.
5 Note that a rule-utilitarian may also make the case for the market in these terms. Here again the rule-
utilitarian would be departing from the standard case in welfare economics.
6 In his paper, Sen’s exact term is ‘weak efficiency’. The precise terms and axioms which Sen uses in 
advancing this claim can be found in Sen (2002, 511–522).
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In terms of the informed desire or preference view, when Pareto efficiency is 
understood in terms of welfare, we must assume that consumer preferences are well 
informed and rational in some strong sense; while when the case is made in terms of 
preference alone, it must only assume that agents are rational to the degree that they 
have coherent preferences—preferences which meet certain standard axioms but sat-
isfaction of which may not connect with their welfare. The second weaker require-
ment on the rationality of agents might be more realistic than the assumption that 
all agents are fully informed and rational. If that is so, and one wishes that the case 
for the market is based on more realistic assumptions about consumer preferences, 
one might favour an opportunity-based defence of the market. But going further, one 
might want to drop even the requirement that preferences are rational in the weaker 
sense that I have just explained—because of experimental work which suggests that 
preferences may not even be coherent. That is the approach which (Sugden 2004, 
2017; see also McQuillin and Sugden 2012) takes in recent defences of the mar-
ket based on the ‘opportunity criterion’. Sugden’s view is also interestingly different 
from those who advance the informed preference view. For Sugden, advantage is 
judged not in terms of informed preferences, but in terms of ‘opportunity as mutual 
advantage’. This involves a person having the opportunity to choose whatever she 
might desire and be willing to pay for (Sugden 2010, 55). If the case for the mar-
ket is made along these lines, the market furthers people’s opportunity to choose 
whatever they might desire and are willing to pay for whether or not the relevant 
desires are informed or rational. This view of advantage is more libertarian than any 
views I have thus far discussed and Sugden (2010, 58–59) links it directly to J.S. 
Mill’s work on liberty (and his ‘harm principle’ in particular). Anyone who wishes 
to look into the nature and content of preferences—whether this is a critic of main-
stream economics or indeed a utilitarian—might potentially object to this defence of 
the market for a variety of reasons. But this defence of the market is quite distinct 
from the standard defence in traditional welfare economics, or even from Sen’s view 
that markets promote opportunity–freedom. And Sandel might raise anti-libertarian 
objections to Sudgen’s defence and its reliance on people’s actual preferences.7 But 
those objections might not apply to standard welfare economics. Indeed, these dif-
ferences between various defences of the market also illustrate the pluralistic nature 
of economics as a discipline and the different approaches that economists can take in 
responding to the criticisms levelled by Anderson and Sandel.
4  Higher and lower goods and the corruption argument
There are goods which, some argue, are priceless. Candidates include: dignity, 
friendship and love. Consider friendship. There is a family of different claims 
involved in arguments about this good. One is that friendship cannot be bought or 
sold: if it could be, it would not be friendship. Sandel (2012, 93) argues that this 
7 Sugden (2006) has explicitly defended the use of actual preferences.
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is a good that ‘money can’t buy’.8 That is hard to contest. There is a related argu-
ment which Sandel also advances: it claims that people are applying a price to a 
good whenever they weigh it against another good (e.g. Sandel 2012, 48–49). Some 
claim that some goods have no price in this sense. And this claim is harder to sus-
tain. One might be attracted to a job in another town if it allows one more autonomy 
and accomplishment than the job one currently has and one might weigh the gain 
in these values against the loss in the time one spends with a good friend. So when 
we say that a good is priceless in this sense, friendship is not a priceless good: some 
amount of it can be weighed against other values.
In arguing that economics should only focus on lower pleasures, Jevons restricted 
the scope of economics on the basis of similar arguments. Having concluded that 
all human motives can be treated as pleasures and pains, Jevons argued that it is 
important to be able to make qualitative distinctions between them. He suggested 
that: ‘the feelings of which a man is capable are of various grades’ and he thought 
a ‘higher motive may rightly overbalance all considerations belonging to the next 
lower stage’. There was, on this view, no basis for weighing lower feelings against 
higher ones: the higher feelings act as ‘trumps’ which can defeat lower feelings. 
Nonetheless, Jevons suggested that if there is no prohibition from higher feelings, 
then the lowest rank of feelings can be weighed against each other and economics 
provides a ‘calculus of utility [which] aims at supplying the ordinary wants of man 
at the lowest cost of labour’ (Jevons 1871, 92–3).
Might an argument of this sort be successfully advanced to restrict the range of 
modern economics? There are various reasons why this is unlikely. First, neoclassi-
cal economics has rejected its hedonist roots. And second, even if some distinction 
between ‘higher-’ and ‘lower-order’ goods could be successfully made along lines 
similar to those Jevons had in mind, any claim to the effect that ‘higher-order’ goods 
are lexically superior to, and act as ‘trumps’ which cannot be weighed against, 
‘lower-order’ goods might appear to be elitist. But the claim of lexical superiority 
might also be implausible: it might be argued that there must be some sufficiently 
large amount of a good of ‘lower order’ which is worth more than, and so is prefer-
able to, some very small amount of a ‘higher-order’ good.
While J.S. Mill’s distinction between higher- and lower-order pleasures may 
not attract some modern economists, there are claims which have a similar flavour 
in the literature on informed desire or preference views. Here is an example from 
James Griffin’s version of that view. Griffin (1986, 85–9) argues that that there may 
be some amount of one good—say, some amount of time enjoying Rembrandt’s 
masterpieces—which, if properly appreciated—is preferred to any amount of time 
enjoying some much lower quality art, such as the lesser painters of the seventeenth-
century Dutch school.9 But even if one could plausibly make claims of this sort—
distinguishing ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ enjoyments in the context of an informed desire 
view—that would hardly provide a plausible basis for distinguishing where econom-
ics or indeed market reasoning should or should not apply. There seems to be no 
8 Sandel (2012, 107) concedes, nonetheless, that money can buy ‘tokens’ and ‘expressions’ of friend-
ship, though he thinks of these in terms of a ‘degraded’ form of the value.




basis for arguing, for example, that the analysis of supply and demand should not 
apply to exhibitions of the work of Leonardo da Vinci or Rembrandt, while it does 
apply to some much lesser artists of their time.
Is there any other modern argument which can do some of the relevant work in 
restricting the scope of economics? Elizabeth Anderson provides an argument of 
this sort even though hers is not an argument about the scope of economics, but 
about the limits of markets. Anderson suggests that in some cases there might be a 
bar on trade-offs between various goods when one belongs to a higher category of 
value than another. Here what distinguishes a higher from a lower-order good relates 
to the norms which apply to each. She writes that:
Money, commodities, conveniences, luxuries, and sensual pleasures represent 
paradigmatic lower goods. They are not simply seen as less valuable, but as 
not even comparable on the same high scales as those on which paradigmatic 
higher goods such as human life, friendship, freedom and human rights are 
measured. (Anderson 1993, 66).
Anderson says of the higher goods that they are ‘incomparable’ to the lower, so 
that there is some form of ‘hierarchical incommensurability’ between the two cat-
egories of goods. She also claims that they are more valuable, which implies that 
they are comparable at least in terms of value. On Anderson’s account, one good is 
of ‘incomparably higher worth’ than another if it is worthy of a higher mode of valu-
ation than the other …’ and she adds that ‘[o]ne way of valuing something is higher 
than another if the things concerning it make deeper, qualitatively more significant 
demands on the attitudes, deliberations, and actions of the valuer’ (Anderson 1993, 
70). She thinks that ‘one way to express the difference in demands is to prohibit 
trade-offs’ (Anderson 1993, 70). This seems to imply the kind of qualitative differ-
ence and prohibition on trade-offs that Jevons thought is involved between different 
types of pleasure. Yet Anderson knows that there are cases where people do trade-
off values such as friendship, and where there is no reason to prohibit such a trade-
off. She writes:
It is usually no offence against a friend for one to move to a distant city to 
obtain a higher paying job, even if the friendship is attenuated because of 
reduced contact. But it is a betrayal for someone to accept another’s offer of 
money on condition she not see her friend so often (Anderson 1993, 70).
So Anderson’s claim is not that we cannot sometimes trade-off higher- and lower-
order goods of the sorts that she distinguishes, but only that trade-offs should some-
times be prohibited. The actual distinction between higher- and lower-order goods 
cannot be made in terms of (incommensurability understood as) a (complete) prohi-
bition on trade-offs between these types of goods.10 Rather it has to do with the fact 
that different norms or kinds of valuation apply to different goods. And Anderson 
thinks that ‘hierarchical incommensurability’ can explain other intuitive ideas. One 
10 See also Joseph Raz’s discussion of ‘constitutive incommensurablity’ (Raz 1986, 345–353).
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of these ideas involves ‘valuing in a higher way things unworthy of all but lower 
modes of valuation’. Examples include: idolatry and ‘commodity fetishism’. ‘Com-
modity fetishism’, according to Anderson, is a ‘characteristic vice of capitalist socie-
ties, [and] consists in a blind devotion to consumer goods, attributing powers and 
values to them that are properly to be found in relations between people’ (Anderson 
1993, 71). In the opposite case, ‘a practice is degrading when it expresses a lower 
valuation of something than it merits’ and an example is slavery ‘because in slavery, 
individuals are valued as mere commodities or use values’ (Anderson 1993, 71). 
And this is the sort of mistaken attitude or reasoning which Sandel thinks might be 
at work when the introduction of the market can corrupt a good. As he puts it: ‘[t]
o corrupt a good or social practice is to degrade it, to treat it according to a lower 
mode of valuation than is appropriate to it’ (Sandel 2013, 126). And he treats such 
potential ‘corruption’ as a serious argument against the spread of market reasoning.
This line of argument can be addressed to economic analysis when it treats as 
commodities goods which are not appropriately understood as goods which can or 
should be exchanged in markets. The standard framework of welfare economics does 
not, however, make any claims about what does and does not count as a commod-
ity: the set of commodities is taken as given. The argument might, nonetheless, have 
force when levelled at market enthusiasts. An example is Becker’s theory of fertility. 
In that theory, Becker (1976) treats children as if they are consumer goods, and more 
specifically treats them as consumer durable goods. He notes that ‘[i]t may seem 
strained, artificial and perhaps even immoral to classify children with cars, houses, 
and machinery’ and he adds ‘this does not imply, however, that the satisfactions or 
costs associated with children are morally the same as those associated with other 
durables’ (Becker 1976, 172–3). Analysing the choice of whether or not to have a 
child, or of how many children to have, in this way might lead people to value or 
think about children in the ‘wrong’ way. It might lead them to value them as trade-
able commodities rather than objects of parental love (see Radin 1996, 7–8 and 13). 
That might ‘corrupt’ the value of personal relationships or of the value of parental 
love. There is an important argument here, one that needs careful consideration.11 
But it is an argument against market enthusiasm of the sort Becker espoused, not 
against the general framework of welfare economics.
Anderson (1993, 164–6) nonetheless also claims that there are reasons why wel-
fare economics encourages the spread of market norms. She argues that: ‘libertari-
anism and welfare economics represent most expansions of the domain of market 
norms as gains in freedom and welfare’. As regards welfare economics, Anderson 
provides no evidence of this. But she goes on to argue that the chief reasons why 
welfare economics does this relate to ‘three fundamental errors in its theory of 
11 This point may also be addressed by Griffin’s version of the informed desire view. On that view, one 
might well say that anyone who treats children or friends as tradeable commodities in the relevant way 
does not appreciate their value. Nonetheless, as with the value of dignity (see Griffin 1986, 82) my guess 
is that Griffin would admit that there are circumstances where people would trade-off some amount of 
these values, e.g. the amount of time spent with a friend versus the amount of time given to the writing 
of a book. Here it must be stressed that the different versions of the informed desire or preference view 
may sometimes differ in how they respond to some of these issues.
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value’: (a) its preference orientation; (b) individualism; and (c) commodity fetish-
ism. I want briefly to argue that if we understand welfare in terms of informed desire 
or preference, we might avoid the first of these and that there are resources within 
the traditional framework of welfare economics might also address the third. I shall 
not discuss the issue of individualism here.12 In (a), Anderson’s claim is that welfare 
economics ties freedom and welfare to the expression or satisfaction of given pref-
erences, rather than to the expression of rational attitudes. Yet if welfare is under-
stood, as it is on some of the accounts I have discussed, in terms of informed desire 
or preference, relevant desires and preferences are expressions of rational attitudes. 
As regards commodity fetishism, Anderson (1993, 166) claims that it ‘pervades the 
conception of human good embraced by welfare economics’ because ‘it defines a 
person’s welfare as the satisfaction of her given preferences, which it conceives as 
automatically expressed in her choices and as taking exclusively appropriated goods 
as their basic objects’. However, if one takes an informed desire or preference view 
of welfare of the sort discussed here, then value resides in the objects of desire or 
preference. And the value of commodities would be understood in terms of their 
contribution to the realisation of those objects. Within the resources of traditional 
welfare economics, characteristics bridge the gap between commodities and the val-
ued ends they serve.
It is nonetheless true that Anderson has pinpointed an important risk—that the 
framework of traditional welfare economics might be understood so that commodi-
ties are regarded as the ultimate objects of preference. The economics profession has 
itself responded to that risk by advancing frameworks—which include, aside from 
Lancaster’s view, Sen’s capability approach (1985)—which explicitly reject the idea 
that commodities are valuable in themselves.13 The characteristics of commodities 
are unsurprisingly also the starting point for Sen when he attempts to address the 
risk of ‘commodity fetishism’ in economics. In making the case for going beyond 
characteristics, Sen (1985, 6) writes that ‘the characteristics of these goods do not 
tell us what the person will be able to do with these properties’. This observation is 
part of what motivates Sen’s capability approach, since it leads him to consider what 
a person is able to do and be in leading a life. This point might be taken up within 
an informed desire or preference view by noting that while characteristics provide a 
bridge between commodities and the objects of ultimate value, what matters is their 
contribution to the realisation of those values and to welfare. To this degree, the 
informed preference view might also be able to do some of the work which Sen does 
by advancing his capability approach.
12 On the issue of ‘individualism’ defined in various ways and informed desire or preference views of 
well-being, see Qizilbash (2014).
13 Indeed, it is surprising that Anderson does not herself note this point in her discussion of welfare 
economics and ‘commodity fetishism’, given that in her subsequent work, Anderson (1999) endorses the 
capability approach in the context of egalitarian justice.
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5  Conclusions
Elizabeth Anderson and Michael Sandel have argued that market reasoning might 
extend beyond its rightful domain and ‘corrupt’ certain important values. Sandel 
thinks that part of the reason it might do so has to do with utilitarian logic and he 
encourages economists to connect with the roots of their discipline in moral and 
political philosophy. He argues that part of the failure of economics to provide a 
helpful view of what goods should and should not be up for sale lies in its ambition 
to be a value-free science. I have argued that, in developing neoclassical econom-
ics under the influence of the classical utilitarians, William Stanley Jevons made 
claims similar to those that Anderson and Sandel have advanced. So it is hard to 
trace the enthusiasm for market reasoning to the origins of neoclassical economics 
in utilitarian thought. Furthermore, inasmuch as the standard case for the market in 
welfare economics assumes that the set of commodities is given, it does not make 
any claims about what is and is not a commodity. Normative economics is not value 
free: it endorses multiple values without taking any definitive view of how to rank 
or weigh these. And economics allows for a variety of moral beliefs. In both these 
ways, it is value pluralist rather than value free.
Jevons’ view that economics should be restricted to the lowest order of pleasures 
is hard to sustain in the landscape of modern economics. Anderson’s view—which 
is a close relative of Jevons’—and the associated ‘corruption’ argument which San-
del has advanced suggest that market reasoning can lead us to value goods accord-
ing to inappropriate norms. This argument has force when addressed to the work 
of market enthusiasts. It might also gain credibility on the grounds that economists 
treat commodities as valuable for themselves. Whatever its merits as an objection to 
market enthusiasm, the corruption argument has limited force as a critique of wel-
fare economics as a normative framework. Furthermore, if one interprets the results 
of welfare economics in terms of the informed desire or preference view—some 
of the alleged weaknesses of economics which Anderson and Sandel mention can 
be rebutted. However, when people’s preferences or desires are not fully informed 
or rational markets will not necessarily deliver efficiency in terms of welfare and 
there is an economic case for government intervention to facilitate better informed 
and reasoned choices. I have argued that this is one way in which economists might 
respond to Anderson and Sandel. But I have also stressed throughout that econom-
ics is a pluralist discipline, and economists might respond in quite different ways to 
these critics. An alternative line of response—developed in different ways by Sen 
and Sugden—would instead suggest that markets promote opportunity rather than 
welfare.
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